WTO campaign after Doha

Asbjørn Wahl

At the time of the Doha summit, the global coalition against the WTO corporate agenda was stronger than at any time before. In the same way, the developing countries were better prepared and more steadfast to their positions than they were before Seattle. In spite of that, the process is back on track after Doha while it broke down in Seattle. Even if the superpowers did not achieve everything they wanted (and that is important), they achieved enough to be able to continue their project of corporate globalisation. As a result of Doha, we will face more neo-liberalism, more deregulation and more ”free” trade in favour of multinational companies of the North. We will have to analyse this situation in order to understand our own position (strengths and weaknesses) and to develop realistic strategies based on the current balance of forces.

There is no doubt; the global coalition (the Our World is Not for Sale-coalition after the title of the statement which formed the political basis of the coalition) has both broadened and deepened over the last two years. More organisations are taken on board, the political consensus is stronger than before, and the coalition has worked extremely well before and during the summit (I was not in Doha, but I have been told that those of you who were there, co-operated in such an excellent way). In particular for those of us who are not working full-time on WTO, the information we received from the Geneva office before Doha and from those of you who informed us from Doha, was very important and useful. We were probably among the best informed of the WTO process in our countries. To receive comprehensive analyses of draft declarations shortly after they had been leaked or released, was impressive.

The great strength of the coalition is exactly that we have a number of highly qualified and very well informed people, quite a few with excellent analytical minds, many very experienced in campaigning and lobbying.

So why did we lose in Doha?
Firstly, we have probably overestimated our own role in the breakdown of the Seattle summit. The contradictions between the US and the EU were more important than many of us have realised. This situation gave both the popular resistance and the developing countries room for manoeuvring. This room was closed before Doha. The US and the EU had obviously learnt from their experiences, and they used their joint power to put pressure on and to bully developing countries and to neglect the NGOs – including our coalition.

Why could they neglect us?
We have to realise that if we really want to change the global trade policy, we will have to change the balance of forces in today’s world. In this regard, the most serious weakness of our coalition is probably the lack of social movements. Most of us who have been involved in lobbying and social struggles have realised that it is not the strength of our arguments which is decisive, but the power we are able to mobilise behind our arguments and demands. We should continue to develop our analyses and policies, but in order to gain ground in this struggle, our main challenge at this stage should be to link our coalition more closely to existing social movements and to give priority to building social movements and to raising their awareness regarding corporate globalisation and trade policy. There is no shortcut which passes the power of the social movements if we really want to change the balance of forces in our societies.

Why did the developing countries give in?
While we were neglected, developing countries mainly gave in to the immense pressure and bullying which was executed by the US and the EU in particular. However, this is not a sufficient explanation. Developing countries did achieve something here and there, but as far as I am concerned, they will still lose more than they gain in the world trade system, and the Doha declaration will contribute to making the situation worse rather than better for the people of the developing world.

If this is a correct analysis, we will also have to take a closer look at the interests of the government representatives of developing countries. When they give in to pressure and are willing to sell out the interests of their own people, it most probably reflects their own interests as representatives of the economic and political elite of their countries.

On the one hand we still have to build alliances with governments of developing countries because their interests are in many ways contradictory to the interests of the superpowers (the US and the EU). On the other hand, we should realise that these are tactical – not strategic – alliances. Our strategic alliances of the South should be – as in the North – the social movements. Also in the South our coalition should give priority to the building of social forces and raising of their awareness, so that they can put pressure on their governments in order to prevent them from giving in to US/EU pressure at the next crossroad.

Conclusions

1.      The coalition should continue to develop what has been successful over the last two years; policies and political analyses, broadening and deepening of the coalition, and campaigning.

2.      In the North we should give priority to attacking our governments and the corporations they serve for what they did in Doha and in general for their agenda of corporate globalisation. We should continuously expose their development-round-rethoric as and when it contradicts with the consequences of their real trade policy.

3.      Both in the North and the South we should put more resources into linking our coalition closer to the social movements (progressive trade unions, peasants' organisations, etc.). We should aim at raising their awareness of globalisation and ”free” trade and try to get more of them into the coalition. We should go harder into the discussions with those parts of the trade union movement that pursue a narrow social clause-policy.

4.      In the South we should build tactical alliances with governments with which we have common interests in certain areas, at the same time as we try to put them under increased pressure from social movements in their own countries. We should criticise and attack them when they give in to pressure and sell out the interests of their own people.

5.      Even though we have to realise that we are in a defensive position, and our immediate demands should reflect that, we should at the same time develop visions and perspectives based on our own principles and values – that is to give substance to our slogan Another World is Possible. This will be decisive if we are to attract the poor, the oppressed and the exploited people of our societies.

6.      There is no time for pessimism. Our coalition is becoming ever stronger. The outcome of Doha should be no surprise taken into consideration the current balance of forces. More people and more organisations are coming out against corporate globalisation as they experience the consequences. The attempts to link trade with terrorism and war is not a sign of strength, but of desperation. Contradictions and confrontations will be harder – as a necessary effect of increasing resistance. It is time to increase our efforts to delegitimise the corporate trade agenda and the existing world order.

(Contribution at a strategy seminar of the global coalition in Brussels 7-9 December 2001.)